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terpreted or applied by the state court, the federal court may not
stay its proceedings even though the state decisions interpreting the
statute are obscure or not definitive, 32 but must interpret the statute
in the light of those decisions. Furthermore, if the statute itself is
unambiguous and clear-capable of bearing only one interpretation-
the federal court need not and should not await the state court's
supplying the obvious answer.33 Since the statute in the instant case
was clear, and there was no question of interpretation, the "doctrine
of abstention" found no application.
Inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the court was properly invoked, it
is submitted that the court of appeals was correct in directing a trial
on the merits. The statutory and judicial restrictions on federal in-
terference with state activities were inapplicable, and there was a
sufficient showing of irreparable harm, both great and immediate,
to warrant granting the injunction.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR EMPLOYEE'S
MISCONDUCT
Kendall v. Go're Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
The defendant-manager of defendant-realty company employed a
complete stranger to paint various interiors of an apartment building
owned by the realty company. According to plaintiff's evidence de-
fendants did not require references, nor was any other investigation
made to ascertain the hired man's character or background. The em-
ployee was assigned to paint the apartment of a young woman who
defendants knew lived alone. While in the apartment the "painter"
strangled the tenant. Subsequently, the employee was adjudicated to
be a person of unsound mind, dangerous and irresponsible. In a suit
brought by the administratrix of the deceased tenant's estate, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia directed a
verdict for the defendants at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence. On
appeal the circuit court reversed and remanded, holding that the ab-
sence of any investigation of the employee would be sufficient to sup-
port a jury finding that defendants were liable for the death of the
tenant.'
32. Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228 (1943).
33. "The statutes involved are clear and there is no such need for interpreta-
tion or other special circumstances as would warrant the Court in staying action
pending proceedings in courts of the state ....." Toomer v. Witsell, 73 F. Supp.
371, 374 (E.D.S.C. 1947). "[W]e agree with the District Court that there is
neither need for interpretation of the statutes nor any other special circumstance
requiring the federal court to stay action pending proceedings in the State courts."
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392 n.15 (1948). The clarity of the ordinance
in the principal case was never questioned by either side. See note 1 supra.
1. Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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The facts of the case suggest several theories that the plaintiff
might have relied upon: (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior mak-
ing the master liable for the action of his servant ;2 (2) negligence of
a landlord to a tenant by creating through affirmative action an unsafe
condition in the premises;, (3) breach of a duty to protect arising
from the relation between plaintiff and defendant, in this case land-
lord-tenant;4 (4) negligence of the defendant in placing a third person
in such relation to another as to create unreasonable risk of injury to
the other person.-
The plaintiff did not invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Since the act of the employee-viz., murder-was far from within the
scope of his employment,6 obviously the defendants could not be liable
under this doctrine. The second possible theory of recovery, the duty
of a landlord making repairs of leased premises not to leave it in a
dangerous condition7 would also seem inapplicable to the facts of the
principal case. Generally, under this theory the condition is a physical
one rather than the activity of a person.8
Under the third theory the relationship between the defendant and
the plaintiff should be considered to determine whether the defendant
had a duty9 to protect the deceased from various foreseeable dangers.10
2. Id. at 681 n.18.
.. Id. at 680-81.
4. Id. at 678-79, 681.
5. Id. at 677-80.
6. RESTATEIENT, AGENCY § 219 (1933); 2 MECHEM, AGENCY § 1874 (2d ed.1914). See La Lone v. Smith, 39 Wash. 2d 167, 234 P.2d 893 (1951). Cf. Smothers
v. Welch & Co., 310 Mo. 144, 274 S.W. 678 (1925) ; Hogle v. H.H. Franklin Mfg.Co., 199 N.Y. 388, 92 N.E. 794 (1910). But see Hall v. Smathers, 240 N.Y. 486,148 N.E. 654 (1925), in which the court in dicta stated that the doctrine of respon-deaf siperor was applicable where tenant was assaulted by defendant's building
superintendent who defendant had reason to know was a dangerous person.Since the plaintiff relied solely on the doctrine of original negligence, the court
gave no reasons to support the statement.
7. The RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 362 (1934), limits negligence to cases in whichthe landlord has left the premises in a more dangerous condition than they werebefore the repair was made. Several courts reject this limitation. See PRoSSER,
TORTS § 80, at 476-77 (2d ed. 1955) ; Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W.2d
844 (1943). Cf. Bailey v. Zlotnick, 149 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1945).8. Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 Atl. 262 (1935); Olsen v. Mading,45 Ariz. 423, 45 P.2d 23 (1935); Bloecher v. Duerbeck, 333 Mo. 359, 62 S.W.2d553 (19:33). In Bailey v. Zlotnick, 149 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1945), in which thelandlord employed an independent contractor, the court expressly distinguishedbetween negligent activity and the defective condition resulting from the negli-
gence, holding the landlord not liable for the former but only for the latter. 149
F.2d at 506-07.
9J. In determining whether liability exists in a negligence case of this type,
assuming defendant is in the causal chain, two distinct problems must be solved.First, it is neessary to determine whether, as a result of defendant's conduct,
there is foreseeability of harm to a person or property. If not, the defendant isfree of negligence and therefore free of liability. But if there is foreseeability ofharm, the defendant's activity may be classified as negligent and the court mayfind liability. However, it is here that the court faces the second problem-i.e.,
whether to limit defendant's liability. For example, suppose defendant-cab com-
pany employs a taxi driver known to be dangerous for assaults. See RESTATE-MENT, TORTS § 319 (1934). If the driver assaults a pedestrian on the street, itis likely defendcant will not be held liable although he was negligent. Cf. Linden
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss2/10
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The court in the principal case seemed to consider this possibility,22
but such an approach does not seem sound as applied to the facts of
the case. Generally this duty rests upon the defendant's custody or
control of the person or thing injured,12 such as the duty of a sheriff
to protect a prisoner. Normally the relation of landlord-tenant does
not create a duty to protect a tenant from harm at the hands of third
persons. It is only when the tenant is living alone and unprotected, as
in the principal case, that such a duty could arise, and even then it
would not extend to all foreseeable dangers. Certainly, had a stranger
murdered the tenant the court would not have held the defendant
liable. Thus, if liability exists, it must logically rest on the fourth
theory, i.e., the relation between the defendant and the tortfeasor.1'
v. City Car Co., 239 Wis. 236, 300 N.W. 925 (1941). But had the taxi driver
assaulted a passenger, the court would probably permit a finding of liability: This
comment is confined to the question of negligence and does not consider the ques-
tion of limiting liability.
10. See Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE
L.J. 886, 899 (1934): "Where the custody of a person is by law entrusted to
another under circumstances which deprive that person of a normal means of
defending himself, there is a duty upon one in charge to exercise reasonable care
to afford protection to the other." The authors argue, for example, that the rela-
tion of sheriff-prisoner imposes a duty on the sheriff to protect the prisoner from
mob violence and other prisoners. Id. at 900-01. Also the authors contend that
an employment relationship imposes a duty on an employer to protect an em-
ployee from known dangers incident to the employment. Id. at 902. This same
line of reasoning could be applied to place a duty on an occupier to protect busi-
ness visitors from conduct of third persons. Id. at 903-05. Several garagekeeper
cases wOuld seem to support this view. In Medes v. Hornbach, 6 F.2d 711 (D.C.
Cir. 1925), the court held that a garagekeeper, having a duty to protect plain-
tiff's automobile, must exercise due care in the employment of servants. Accord,
Goldberg v. Kunz, 185 Md. 492, 45 A.2d 279 (1946).
It should be noted that under the above rule, the general definition of liability
in terms of relationship to the injured party indicates that it is not essential for
the injured party to be on defendant's land. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 320 (1934).
11. 236 F.2d at 678-79, 681.
12. See note 10 supra.
13. The garagekeeper cases cited in note 10 supra might also be subject to the
same analysis. For example, in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Fawkes, 120 Minn.
353, 139 N.W. 703, 705 (1913), the court indicated that it was negligent to retain
an employee: "If he [employer] had notice or knowledge.., that such employee
was possessed of proclivities rendering it likely that he would injure the property
of others so delivered it was his duty to exercise ordinary care to protect the
same from the danger of injury to which it was thus subjected." It would appear,
therefore, that the garagekeeper would be absolved of liability although he was
negligent in selection of the employee, if the proclivity of the employee was not
the same as the actual conduct which caused the damage. For example, in the
Travelers Indemnity Co. case, a garagekeeper knew the employee was likely to
damage a customer's vehicle, but the court indicated it would have denied liability
if the tort of the servant was a theft of the car. See also Renfroe v. Fouch, 26
Ga. App. 340, 106 S.E. 303 (1921) (syllabus opinion).
[I]f a principal, without exercising due care in selection, employs a vicious
person to do an act which necessarily brings him in contact with others
-while in the performance of a duty, he is subject to liability for harm caused
by the vicious propensity .... If liability results it is because, under the
circumstances, the employer has not taken the care which a prudent man
would take in selecting the person for the business in hand .... Liability
results ... not because of the relationship of the parties but because the
employer antecedently had reason to believe that an undue risk of harm
would exist because of the employment....
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 213, comment d (1934).
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Under the fourth theory liability rests upon creating an unreason-
able risk to another through the employment of a third person who is
likely to commit torts or crimes.14 Several cases have held the landlord
liable for employing persons who he knows or should know are
likely to cause injury to a party on the premises. 5 The next extension
of the doctrine occurs in a few cases which impose liability when the
14. The actor's conduct may create a situation which affords an opportunity
or temptation to third persons to commit more serious forms of misconducts
which may be of any of several kinds. (1) The third person may intend to
bring about the very harm which the other sustains. (2) He may not intend
to bring it about but may intentionally so misconduct himself as to make
such harm probable. (3) He may act recklessly in conscious indifference to
the safety of others. The actor is required to anticipate and provide against
all of these misconducts under the following conditions in all of which it is
immaterial to the actor's civil liability that the third person's misconduct is
or is not criminal at common law or under a statute:
5. where he has brought into contact with the other, or intentionally caused
the other to associate himself with, a person whom the actor knows or
should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional or reckless mis-
conduct; the association being one which creates temptation to, or affords
peculiar opportunity for, such misconduct ....
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 302, comment n (1934). See also RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY § 213, comment d (1934).
The doctrine was rejected by several of the older cases. See Henderson v. Dade
Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568, 28 S.E. 251 (1897) (defendant negligent in guarding con-
victed sexual offender who raped plaintiff after escape, but held not liable because
convict was an independent intervening force); Oakland City Agricultural and
Industrial Soc'y v. Bingham, 4 Ind. App. 545, 31 N.E. 383 (1892) (defendant not
negligent in absence of facts sufficient to raise doctrine of respondeat superior).
As late as 1931, the Louisiana court in Cappel v. Pierson, 15 La. App. 524, 132
So. 391 (1931), refused to recognize the doctrine. In the last cited case the de-
fendant-superintendent of an insane asylum released a homicidal maniac who
shortly thereafter killed plaintiff's husband. Conceding that the defendant was
negligent, the court found him not liable for lack of proximate causation. This
position seems inconsistent since the hazard that occurred was that which made
the conduct negligent. See Harper & Kime, supra note 10, at 898; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 449 (1934).
The modern trend is to accept the doctrine. Austin W. Jones Co. v. State, 122
Me. 214, 119 Atl. 577 (1923) (defendant liable for negligence in paroling insane
person who burned plaintiff's building); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Wood, 95 Tex.
223, 66 S.W. 449 (1902) (defendant liable for his guard's negligence in letting
smallpox charge escape and infect plaintiff). This same rule seems applicable
where one puts a dangerous chattel in the control of a third person who is likely
to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others in using it. RESTATEMENT, TORTS§ 308 (1934). See, e.g., Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6 (1922)(defendant held liable to plaintiff for negligence in permitting an intoxicated
friend to drive his car).
The usual reason given for finding negligence is that the defendant stands in
such a relation to the third person as to give him some control over his actions.
PROSSER, TORTS 189-90 (2d ed. 1955) ; Harper & Kime, supra note 10 at 895-98.
See Brooke v. Bool, [1928] 2 K.B. 578. See also cases cited in notes 15-20 infra.
However, "control" should be liberally construed to include cases in which the
harm occurs after defendant's relationship to the tortfeasor has ended. E.g., in
Janof v. Newsom, 53 F.2d 149 (1931), defendant-employment agency violated the
licensing statute by failing to check references of the person it sent as a servant
to plaintiff's home. The next day the servant made off with plaintiff's jewelry.
Had defendant investigated, he would have discovered that the servant had been
guilty of similar thefts. The court held the violation of the statute constituted
negligence and refused to limit liability because the statute was intended to pro-
tect persons in the plaintiff's class.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss2/10
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injury to plaintiff occurs on the plaintiff's premises rather than on the
defendant's.16 The principal case is of course an excellent example.
It is doubtful, however, whether land ownership or possession is of
any material importance in determining liability. For example, in
Fleming v. Bronfin,'7 in which the employee assaulted the plaintiff on
the latter's premises, the court said: "One dealing with the public is
bound to use reasonable care to select employees competent and fit for
the work assigned to them and to refrain from retaining the services
of an unfit employee."1 s The court, in holding defendant liable, did not
consider as relevant the fact that the injury did not occur on his
premises. In La Lone v. Smith,"9 a landlord, who retained an employee
known to be of violent temper and guilty of previous assaults, was
held liable for the employee's assault on a tenant, not because the act
occurred on the defendant's premises, but on the general principle that
"negligent employment or retention of an incompetent employee makes
the employer liable for injuries inflicted upon a third party by such
employee. ' 20 Thus, it is submitted, when an employer knows or
should know that an employee has a propensity for misconduct, he will
be liable for injuries inflicted on persons to whom he sends the em-
ployee where the tort results from the injurious propensities.2 1
15. See, e.g., Hall v. Smathers, 240 N.Y. 486, 148 N.E. 654 (1925), in which
the landlord was held liable for retaining building superintendent known to be
dangerous who assaulted the tenant-plaintiff in basement of the building. See also
Henderson v. Nolting First Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S.E. 347 (1937); La
Lone v. Smith, 39 Wash. 2d 167, 234 P.2d 893 (1951).
The same line of reasoning might be applied to garagekeepers held liable for
damage by reason of their negligent selection or retention of employees. See
Renfroe v. Fouch, 26 Ga. App. 340, 106 S.E. 303 (1921) (syllabus opinion); Trav-
elers Indemnity Co. v. Fawkes, 120 Minn. 353, 139 N.W. 703 (1913); Handley v.
O'Gorman, 45 R.I. 242, 121 Atl. 399 (1923). See also Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 403, 440
(1955).
16. The leading case is probably Brooke v. Bool, [1928] 2 K.B. 578, in which
the defendant-landlord was authorized to enter and inspect tenant's shop at night.
When another tenant reported to defendant that he had detected the odor of es-
caping gas, defendant invited him into the shop to help find the leak. Defendant
struck a match in an effort to locate the leak. When he failed, the invitee climbed
on top of a counter and struck another match. The resulting explosion injured
plaintiff's goods. The court found the defendant liable on any one of three
grounds: (1) agency, (2) failure to control invitee, and (3) joint-enterprise. Cf.
Janof v. Newsom, 53 F.2d 149 (1931).
17. 80 A.2d 915 (D.C. Mun. App. 1951).
18. Id. at 917. The court cited RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 213, comment d (1934)
and RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 302, comment n (1934).
19. 39 Wash. 2d 167, 234 P.2d 893 (1951).
20. Id. at 171 234 P.2d at 896. The court relied almost completely on RESTATE-
MENT, AGENCY § 213, comment d (1934). See also Henderson v. Nolting First
Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S.E. 347 (1937), in which defendant-landlord retained
a janitor who had assaulted others previously. The janitor fired a shotgun
through a tenant's window and the landlord was held liable for the injuries.
Again, the controlling factor was that the landlord allowed his servant to come
in contact with others. Id. at 736-39, 193 S.E. at 354-55.
21. The courts unanimously hold the employer liable when he knows or should
have known of the dangerous propensity of the employee. See, e.g. Henderson
v. Nolting First Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 735, 193 S.E. 347, 353 (1937). Logically
the next question presented is whether the employer is under a duty to investi-
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Nor does the liability of the employer appear to be restricted to
those cases where he deliberately places the employee in contact with
the plaintiff. For example, in Fletcher v. Baltimore & Potomae R.R., 22
the defendant was found negligent in permitting its employees to
throw, from moving trains, kindling wood for their personal use. In
Hoglc o,. H.H. Fraizllin Mfg. Co.,- an employer was found negligent
in allowing its employees to throw iron objects out of the factory
windows.
Thus, several propositions concerning the employer's liability for
the employee's torts seem rather evident. It would appear that an em-
ployer has a duty to refrain from employing persons having propensi-
ties toward committing torts. His liability should not be limited be-
cause of the intervening act of the employee, for it is the foreseeability
of this very circumstance that renders the employment negligent.24
The doctrine thus formed would cover untold situations: e.g., the
house-to-house salesman, the proprietor who sends his employees into
private homes, and the filling-station operator who sends an employee
on a repair call. The principal case merely represents another appli-
cation of the growing doctrine.
The issue of causal relation raises difficult problems in some of the
cases arising under this doctrine, and this is true of the principal case.
gate the employee, or whether he must have actual knowledge of the propensity
or at least of facts from which knowledge might be inferred. A reading of the
cases indicates that if the selection of the employee is not negligent, the employer
is under no duty to investigate further. If, however, he later learns of dangerous
propensities, subsequent retention is negligent. Cf. Henderson v. Nolting First
Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S.E. 347 (1937); Traveler's Indemnity Co. v.
Fawkes, 120 Minn. 353, 139 N.W. 703 (1913) ; La Lone v. Smith, 39 Wash. 2d 167,
234 P.2d 893 (1951). In any case he has the duty to investigate when selecting
the employee. Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Argonne
Apartment House Co. v. Garrison, 42 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1930) ; Medes v. Horn-
bach, 6 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1951). Cf. Janof v. Newsom, 53 F.2d 149 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (statutory duty
to investigate).
Whether there has been a sufficient investigation is usually a jury question.
See, e.q., Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Fleming v.
Bronfin, 104 A.2d 407 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954). Sometimes, of course, the investi-
gation may be held adequate as a matter of law. See Argonne Apartment House
Co. v. Garrison, 42 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1930). See also Bradley v. Stevens, 329
Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951).
22. 168 U.S. 135 (1897). The Court said:
It is not a question of scope of employment or that the act of the individual
is performed by one who has ceased for the time being to be in the employ-
ment of the company. The question is, does the company owe any duty
whatever to the general public, or, in other words, to individuals who may
be in the streets through which its railroad tracks are laid, to use reasonable
diligence to see to it that those who are on its trains shall not be guilty of
any act which might reasonably be called dangerous and liable to result in
injuries to persons on the street, where such act could by the exercise of
reasonable diligence on the part of the company have been prevented?
Id. at 140.
23. 199 N.Y. 388, 92 N.E. 794 (1910).
24. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 449 (1934). However, liability may be limited
on other grounds. See note 9 supra. But the reader is reminded that the issue of
limiting liability is beyond the scope of this comment.
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Technically, if the plaintiff shows that the defendant did not investi-
gate at all or investigated inadequately, he makes a case for the jury
on the issue of negligence and he also shows a clear causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the harm. But, if his proof does
not show that a reasonable investigation would have given notice of
the danger, he has failed to demonstrate clearly that there is a causal
relation between the defendant's negligence and the harm.25 The ques-
tion is whether the plaintiff should be required to offer further proof
on this issue, or whether it should simply be left to the defendant to
show that a reasonable investigation would not have put him on no-
tice. Since the proof on the issue of causation need only be by a pre-
ponderance of evidence, it is submitted, that the plaintiff should be
allowed to go to the jury. Once negligence is established, it seems that
a causal relation between negligence and harm is likely enough to per-
mit a jury to draw the inference if it wishes. 26 The trial court in the
principal case directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence.which showed that the defendant had made no in-
vestigation but did not show what an investigation would have re-
vealed. In reversing this, the court of appeals held, inferentially at
least, that the plaintiff had made a jury case without further proof on
the issue of causation. An earlier decision of the same court in a simi-
lar case, Argonne Apartment House Co. v. Garrison,27 contains this
sentence: "There was no evidence to show that a further investigation
would have disclosed sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice as
to the dishonesty of Johnson.1' 28 In its context this may mean that the
burden of showing what a reasonable investigation would have re-
vealed is on the plaintiff. Under the circumstances, the law of the
court on this point must be considered doubtful, but it is submitted
that the conclusion inferentially reached in the principal case is cor-
rect. Of course, it should always be open to the defendant to show
that a reasonable investigation would have been fruitless.
25. A similar issue arises in the manufacturer's liability cases, for the manu-
facturer"s conduct is always clearly connected to the harm done by his products,
but his negligence is not causally connected if a reasonable inspection would not
have revealed the defect. See Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
207 Wis. 209, 216, 240 N.W. 392, 395 (1932) ; PRossER, TORTS 505-06 (2d ed. 1955).
26. See Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523 (1956).
27. 42 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
28. Id. at 608.
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